Introduction-
On 20 November 2025, the Supreme Court of India, while exercising its advisory jurisdiction under Article 143, delivered a landmark opinion on the constitutional powers of Governors and the President concerning the grant of assent to Bills.
In this significant judgment, the Court addressed fourteen questions referred by the Hon’ble President Droupadi Murmu through a Presidential Reference, along with several ancillary issues requiring clarification. These questions primarily related to the correct interpretation and scope of the Governor’s powers under Articles 200 and 201 of the Constitution of India.
- “What are the constitutional options before a Governor when a Bill is presented to him under Article 200 of the Constitution of India?
- Is the Governor bound by the aid & advice tendered by the Council of Ministers while exercising all the options available with him when a Bill is presented before him under Article 200 of the Constitution of India?
- Is the exercise of constitutional discretion by the Governor under Article 200 of the Constitution of India justiciable?
- Is Article 361 of the Constitution of India an absolute bar to the judicial review in relation to the actions of a Governor under Article 200 of the Constitution of India?
- In the absence of a constitutionally prescribed time limit, and the manner of exercise of powers by the Governor, can timelines be imposed and the manner of exercise be prescribed through judicial orders for the exercise of all powers under Article 200 of the Constitution of India by the Governor?
- Is the exercise of constitutional discretion by the President under Article 201 of the Constitution of India justiciable?
- In the absence of a constitutionally prescribed timeline and the manner of exercise of powers by the President, can timelines be imposed and the manner of exercise be prescribed through judicial orders for the exercise of discretion by the President under Article 201 of the Constitution of India?
- In light of the constitutional scheme governing the powers of the President, is the President required to seek advice of the Supreme Court by way of a reference under Article 143 of the Constitution of India and take the opinion of the Supreme Court when the Governor reserves a Bill for the President’s assent or otherwise?
- Are the decisions of the Governor and the President under Article 200 and Article 201 of the Constitution of India, respectively, justiciable at a stage anterior into the law coming into force? Is it permissible for the Courts to undertake judicial adjudication over the contents of a Bill, in any manner, before it becomes law?
- Can the exercise of constitutional powers and the orders of/by the President/Governor be substituted in any manner under Article 142 of the Constitution of India?
- Is a law made by the State legislature a law in force without the assent of the Governor granted under Article 200 of the Constitution of India?
- In view of the proviso to Article 145(3) of the Constitution of India, is it not mandatory for any bench of this Hon’ble Court to first decide as to whether the question involved in the proceedings before it is of such a nature which involves substantial questions of law as to the interpretation of constitution and to refer it to a bench of minimum five Judges?
- Do the powers of the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India limited to matters of procedural law or Article 142 of the Constitution of India extends to issuing directions /passing orders which are contrary to or inconsistent with existing substantive or procedural provisions of the Constitution or law in force?
- Does the Constitution bar any other jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to resolve disputes between the Union Government and the State Governments except by way of a suit under Article 131 of the Constitution of India?”
Amid the recent instances of prolonged delays by several Governors in acting upon Bills passed by State Legislatures, this judgment serves as a significant clarification and establishes an important precedent, effectively removing the ambiguities surrounding the constitutional obligations in such matters. The Supreme Court explaining the extent of constitutional limits under Article 200 and 201 observed that no judicially set timelines can be placed on the Governors or the President for granting assent to the Bills. In furtherance of the issue, the Court also acknowledged that the Constitution of India does not recognise the idea of “deemed assent” for passing of the Bills.
The concerned provisions of law in question, Article 200 deals with the Governor’s choices for the grant assent, withhold assent, return the Bill if it is not a Money Bill, or reserve it for the President while Article 201 categorically highlights that once a Bill is reserved, the President can either give or withhold assent. In these provisions along with Article 111 which covers the subject of President’s assent to parliamentary Bills, the Constitution does not set a specific deadline for giving assent. This lack of a timeline became an important point of focus in the reasoning of the Court’s judgement.
Concept of Deemed Consent –
While conceptualising the meaning of deemed consent in context of assent to Bills, the Apex Court made an observation denying the idea that failure to take action fast enough implies that “approval is assumed”. The Constitution does not mention that keeping quiet or doing nothing means automatic or implied approval to the Bill. For passing of a Bill, each such Bill needs a clear action as per the Constitution; either approval or rejection by the Governor at State or the President at Union. Further, the idea of implied or assumed assent would make an addition of a fifth choice which is not present in Article 200 which ultimately would change the law itself and damage the spirit of the Constitution’s plan for assent to Bills.
Even though the Court did not set exact deadlines, it emphasised that Governors and the President cannot hold onto Bills forever. Article 200 states that it is upon the Governor or the President as a constitutional requirement to take action within an “appropriate period” on the Bill. Hence, any extended, unclear, or politically driven lack of action interferes with the elected Legislature’s ability to make laws and goes against democratic and federal ideas. If there is an unreasonable lack of action, Courts can give a specific order, directing the constitutional authority to make a choice but not telling them what that choice has to be.
Limitations of Governor role:
The Supreme Court’s stance on the issue made it clear that the Governor does not have separate political power and is not allowed to use the power to approve laws to get in the way of what the elected government wants to do. According to language of Article 163, the Governor must do what the group of ministers tells them to do, except for a few specific situations where they can make decisions on their own. The process of approving laws under Article 200 is not one of those situations where they can make decisions on their own. Holding back or wrongly using the power to send laws to the President for consideration for an unreasonably long time goes against what is right under the constitution and hurts the balance of power between the central and state governments.
Presidential Powers under Constitution:
A simple read of Article 74 makes it clear that when a proposed law is set aside, the President has to do what the group of Union Ministers tells them. The Apex Court made it clear that the President, just like the Governor, does not have the power to reject something on their own like in the United States. The job of the President is set by the constitution, and it cannot be altered or used as a way to stop laws from States forever which means that the constitution is still in control, and decisions made by leaders are still connected to what the people want.
Balancing between Separation of Powers and Federalism:
The judgment strikes a careful balance between the powers and duties. It protects the supremacy of elected legislatures by preventing constitutional heads from frustrating bills through endless inaction. At the same time, it preserves the constitutional distribution of powers by refusing to create judge made timelines or “deemed assent”, which would have distorted Articles 200 and 201. The decision strengthens federal governance, upholds constitutional morality, and respects the basic structure doctrine, particularly separation of powers and parliamentary democracy.
Opinion of the Court –
After duly considered the issues in light of the foregoing findings and observations, the Hon’ble Supreme Court for a definitive pronouncement on the Presidential Reference –
1 The Governor has three constitutional options before him, under Article 200, namely – to assent, reserve the Bill for the consideration of the President, or withhold assent and return the Bill to the Legislature with comments. The first proviso to Article 200 is bound to the substantive part of the provision, and restricts the existing options, rather than offering a fourth option. Pertinently, the third option – to withhold assent and return with comments – is only available to the Governor when it is not a Money Bill.
- The Governor enjoys discretion in choosing from these three constitutional options and is not bound by the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, while exercising his function under Article 200.
- The discharge of the Governor’s function under Article 200, is not justiciable. The Court cannot enter into a merits review of the decision so taken. However, in glaring circumstances of inaction that is prolonged, unexplained, and indefinite – the Court can issue a limited mandamus for the Governor to discharge his function under Article 200 within a reasonable time period, without making any observations on the merits of the exercise of his discretion.
- Article 361 of the Constitution is an absolute bar on judicial review in relation to personally subjecting the Governor to judicial proceedings. However, it cannot be relied upon to negate the limited scope of judicial review that this Court is empowered to exercise in situations of prolonged inaction by the Governor under Article 200. It is clarified that while the Governor continues to enjoy personal immunity, the constitutional office of the Governor is subject to the jurisdiction of this court.
- In the absence of constitutionally prescribed time limits, and the manner of exercise of power by the Governor, it would not be appropriate for this Court to judicially prescribe timelines for the exercise of powers under Article 200.
- For similar reasoning as held with respect to the Governor, the President’s assent under Article 201 too, is not justiciable.
- For the same reasons as indicated in the context of the Governor under Article 200, it is clarified that the President, too, cannot be bound by judicially prescribed timelines in the discharge of functions under Article 201.
- In our constitutional scheme, the President is not required to seek advice of this Court by way of reference under Article 143, every time a Governor reserves a Bill for the President’s assent. The subjective satisfaction of the President is sufficient. If there is a lack of clarity, or the President so requires advice of this Court on a Bill, it may be referred under Article 143, as it has been done on numerous previous occasions.
- The decisions of the Governor and President under Articles 200 and 201 respectively, are not justiciable at a stage anterior into the law coming into force. It is impermissible for the Courts to undertake judicial adjudication over the contents of a Bill, in any manner, before it becomes law. Pertinently, discharge of its role under Article 143, does not constitute ‘judicial adjudication’.
- The exercise of constitutional powers and the orders of the President/Governor cannot be substituted in any manner under Article 142, and we hereby clarify that the Constitution, specifically Article 142 even, does not allow for the concept of ‘deemed assent’ of Bills.
- Question 11 is answered in accordance with our opinion tendered on Question 10, i.e., there is no question of a law made by the State Legislature coming into force without assent of the Governor under Article 200. The Governor’s legislative role under Article 200 cannot be supplanted by another constitutional authority.
12.We have already indicated in our opinion, that Question 12 relating to the Article 145(3) and the composition of benches in this Court that hear cases of constitutional importance is irrelevant to the functional nature of this reference, and is returned unanswered.
- We have also indicated in our opinion that Question 13 concerning the power under Article 142 is overly broad, and not possible to answer in a definitive manner. Our opinion on the scope of Article 142 in the context of the functions of the Governor and President has already been answered as a part of Question 10.
14 Question 14 – pertaining to this Court’s jurisdiction to resolve disputes between the Union and State Governments outside of Article 131 – is also found to be irrelevant to the functional nature of the reference and hence returned unanswered.
Conclusion:
In an elaborate and detailed judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme court while answering the Presidential reference has issued a clear constitutional message that Governors and the President must act with constitutional responsibility, but courts cannot assume legislative authority by framing rigid timelines or introducing mechanisms not envisaged by the Constitution. The ruling is a balanced reaffirmation of India’s constitutional design, ensuring that no organ of the State neither the Legislature, Executive, nor the Judiciary oversteps its boundaries while maintaining the integrity of the law-making process.
Presedential rule Landmark Judgement